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140. Samuele Murtinu: How Low Time Preference Elevates the Investment Returns of Family Corporate Venture Capital

Family businesses play a major role in the US economy. According to the Conway Center, family businesses comprise 90% of the business ventures in the US, generate 62% of the employment in the nation, and deliver 64% of US GDP.

And, they’re good at venture capital. Samuele Murtinu, Professor of Law, Economics, and Governance at Utrecht University, visits the Economics For Business podcast to share the findings and insights from his very recent analysis of venture capital databases.

Key Takeaways and Actionable Insights

Corporate venture capital is a special animal.

There are many types of venture capital. Professor Murtinu focused first on the distinction between traditional or independent venture capital (IVC) and corporate venture capital (CVC). Independent venture capital funds are structured with a general partner in the operational, decision-making role, and investors in the role of limited partner.

Corporate venture capital funds are fully owned and managed by their parent corporation. The CEO or CFO of the corporation typically appoints a corporate venture capital manager, who selects targets, conducts due diligence and so on from a subordinate position in the corporate hierarchy.

The important difference between IVC and CVC lies in objectives and goals. IVC goals are purely financial — the highest capital gain in the shortest possible time. CVC funds often have strategic goals in addition to, or substituting for, financial goals. These strategic goals might include augmenting internal R&D capabilities and performance, and accessing new technologies and new innovations, or entering new markets.

Another form of CVC licenses patented technologies to startups in cases where the corporate firm does not have the capacity to exploit the IP, but can oversee the implementation at the startup with a view to further future investment or acquisition. This is the method of Microsoft’s IP Ventures arm, for example.

Typically, IVC investments are easy to measure against financial performance benchmarks or targets. CVC’s strategic investments are harder to measure. Goals such as technology integration are too non-specific to measure, and normal VC guardrails like specified duration of investments are not typically in place and so can’t be used as benchmarks. On the other hand, CVC investments often expand beyond the financial into strategic support via corporate assets such as brand, sales and distribution channels and systems.

Corporate venture capital out-performs traditional venture capital in overall economic performance.

Professor Murtinu’s performance metric in his data analysis was total factor productivity — performance over and above what’s attributable to the additions to capital and labor inputs. IVC’s performance for its investments was measured in the +40% range, and CVC’s was measured at roughly +50%. IVC performs better in the short term, while CVC performs better in the longer term. This difference reflects the lower time preference of CVC. It extends to IPO’s: corporate venture capital funds stay longer in the equity capital of their portfolio companies in comparison to independent venture capital.

Family CVC is another animal again — and even higher performing than non-family CVC.

Professor Murtinu separated out family-owned firms (based on a percentage of equity held) with corporate venture capital funds for analysis. Some of his findings include:

  • They prefer to maintain longer and more stable involvement in the companies in which they invest.
  • They prefer to maintain control over time (as opposed to exiting for financial gain).
  • They look to gains beyond purely financial returns, including technology acquisition / integration into the parent company and/or learning new processes.
  • They are more likely to syndicate with other investors, for purposes of portfolio risk mitigation.
  • They target venture investments that are “close to home” both in geographic terms and in terms of industries closely related to their core business.

The resultant outcomes are superior: a higher likelihood of successful exits (IPO or sale to another entity), and a greater long term value effect on the sold company after the IPO or exit. Further, there is evidence from the data of a higher innovation effect for Family CVC holdings, as measured by the post-exit value of the patent portfolio held by the ventures.

Family CVC is resilient in economic downturns. During the last economic downturn, family CVC invested at double the amount of corporate venture capital, reflecting family businesses’ preference for long-term investing and for control.

The lower time preference of family businesses and family CVC is crucial for the achievement of superior financial performance, especially in the longer term.

Family CVC’s lower time preference and longer investment time horizons result in beneficial effects. Ownership in the venture companies is more stable, and the value effect after IPO (when family CVC stability continues because these funds stay in the post-IPO company longer) is significant.

Professor Murtinu relates this phenomenon to Austrian economics. The longer time horizon permits a closer relationship between investor and entrepreneur — it develops over time — and their subjective judgment about the future state become more aligned. Frictions and information asymmetries are reduced, and a shared view of the future emerges. This stability can scale up to the industry level and national level when there are more family CVC funds at work. Instead of pursuing unicorns and gazelles, an environment more conducive to duration and resilience is created.

Additional Resources

“Types of Venture Capital” (PDF): Download PDF

“Families In Corporate Venture Capital” by Samuele Murtinu, Mario Daniele Amore, and Valerio Pelucco (PDF): Download Paper

123. Sergio Alberich on Capital Structure and Capital Flexibility

The proper selection of a firm’s financial source does not guarantee its success, but the wrong one assures its failure.

Austrian capital theory delivers actionable insights for business. Austrian theory emphasizes capital’s economic role in generating customer revenue flows. Since these flows are variable, entrepreneurial capital must exhibit a capacity for agile and flexible combination and re-combination to keep revenue flows refreshed and current, Since capital structure plays an important role in entrepreneurial judgment, decisions, and action, it must support fast, flexible and unconstrained decision making. Businesses can benefit from their understanding of capital through this Austrian lens. Sergio Alberich helps the Economics For Business podcast listeners, and business practitioners in all kinds of businesses at all stages for their development, to Think Austrian in matters of capital structure.

Download The Episode Resource “Austrian Capital Financing” (PDF) – Download

Key Takeaways & Actionable Insights

Entrepreneurs designing a firm’s capital structure should view their choices through the twin lenses of ownership and control.

Ownership and control are tradeable assets for the entrepreneurial firm. In order to obtain capital financing, one or the other or both might be offered up by the entrepreneur or requested by the financier.

How will shared ownership play out now and in the future? Will ownership imply only a share in any future returns? How great a share is the entrepreneur willing to trade? What will it feel like to receive only a portion of the return the entrepreneur worked for? How much more ownership will be given up in future financing rounds?

Can ownership be traded without any loss of control over decision-making and future investments? Alternatively, how much control should be traded? A board seat? An investment committee? The financier wants the entrepreneur to be free to make the decisions for which he or she is best-informed and most capable, and yet wants to be protected from managerial error.

There are many factors that can stand in the way of capital flexibility, and organizational issues of ownership and control become paramount.

Debt and equity are the basic choices as building blocks of capital structure.

Debt and equity are basically different kinds of contracts between the individuals managing / operating a project and those funding it. Debt is a fixed claim with a known annual return to the debt holder. Typically, the debt holder has no control over management decisions and is not involved in managing the company (although there are some covenants that can be written to provide some distant control).

The return on equity for the financial investor is residual, after debt repayments are made, leaving entrepreneurs relatively free to allocate costs and direct operations. But equity holders typically hold voting rights, and can therefore exercise some control in some circumstances. They may also exert strong influence on management decisions based on relationships. For example, family and friends investors may exert special relationship influence.

There are some debt-equity hybrids — most notably convertible notes, debt that is convertible into equity at some future stage or event. The negotiation of this instrument brings more complexity to the ownership-control debate, while giving the entrepreneur leeway to consider issues of valuation in the future rather than at the current financing.

Entrepreneurs must also consider human factors, especially the number of people in the capital structure.

Another major consideration for entrepreneurs is whether to raise debt or equity from a few people or many (e.g., via IPO or a bond that hedge fund investors can buy). Raising capital from large numbers of investors creates categorically different situations for the entrepreneur. An IPO, for example, can not be a highly tailored instrument. Institutional conventions and regulatory rules impose many requirements about how entrepreneurs and their managers communicate, how they frame financial risk, and about the nature of widespread shareholder engagement they take on. Just think of the interaction of Elon Musk on Twitter, with the SEC, and with short sellers.

In general, the fewer the number of investors, the greater the operating flexibility for the entrepreneur. There are fewer people to convince when business seeks to make a major change, or to pivot.

Sergio Alberich outlined 4 levels of consideration for the financial investor providing capital to the entrepreneurial firm.

Level 1: How are the factors of production combined in the firm, and how might the combination change in the future? Elements of this level of consideration include the stage of business in its growth journey and the assessed maturity of its business model, industry, and competitive set; the nature of the business’s relationship with partners, suppliers, channels and customers; and the state of knowledge regarding product, service and market development.

Level 2: What is the nature and scale of cash flows now and in the future? Are there mature, reliable cash flows? Is one part of the business a drain on cash resources? Is cash coming in from investments for operating expenses (which are not really flexible).

Layer 3: What are the possibilities for returns? Both entrepreneurs and investors seek profit – not just accounting profit on the P&L but returns on equity. At an early stage, a company may worry about generating future cash flows and less about the cost of equity (in terms of sacrificed future returns) to finance growth. A more mature company with cash flows in the present pays much more attention to the cost of equity, and to cost of capital in general, seeking to preserve as much return as possible.

It is often the case that entrepreneurs give up too much equity in order to secure early stage venture capital funding, whether directly of via convertible loans. To keep the entrepreneur motivated with equity that promises future returns, it is best for them to deal with just a few investors who understand this motivation.

Organizational design is relevant, too. For example, a law firm with 100 partners, each of whom own 1 share, and limit their business model collaboration to sharing real estate costs and IT expenses, while effectively running 100 projects, might be creating a politicized nest of vipers. A partnership with shared equity in one business, where everyone stands to lose a lot if there is a bad decision, is likely to be much more collaborative, conducting a unified business, rather than acting as a co-operative of individuals sharing costs.

In the end, subjectivism in entrepreneurship prevails.

As we emphasized in episode #108 (see Mises.org/E4B_108), businesses perform best when entrepreneurs are free to make subjective decisions. The proper source of capital is one that most enables this subjective freedom, which may not be the optimum source based on spreadsheet calculations. Subjectivity and entrepreneurial judgement are not math. The best economic role of capital finance lies in helping entrepreneurs make better human subjective decisions. This is the essence of the means-ends calculation for both entrepreneurs and investors. Austrian economics gives by far the best guidance on this economic role of capital.

Additional Resources

“Austrian Capital Financing” (PDF): Download PDF

“Austrian School vs. Neoclassical School” (PDF): Download PDF